外文翻譯--日本的中小企業(yè)融資我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)

1、<p>　　中文3570字，2200單詞，1.2萬英文字符</p><p>　譯文：日本的中小企業(yè)融資：我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)上杉一郎，RIETI，研究與審查，2006.01在整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)泡沫時(shí)期和隨后的“衰落的十年” ，主流日本經(jīng)濟(jì)已變成了各大銀行和大型企業(yè)。這些機(jī)構(gòu)是經(jīng)濟(jì)泡沫創(chuàng)生背后的推動(dòng)力。同時(shí)他們也是經(jīng)濟(jì)泡沫破滅最大的受害者的;他們承受了巨大的損失艱難的度過了許多年。然而，日本經(jīng)濟(jì)并不只包括大型銀行和公司。與此

2、相反，約有70 ％的工作人群受雇于中小型企業(yè)（ SMEs ）并且中小型企業(yè)創(chuàng)造了接近一半的國(guó)民生產(chǎn)總值。由此可見，日本經(jīng)濟(jì)是共存的大型企業(yè)和中小型企業(yè)的結(jié)合。于是中小企業(yè)如何順利的獲得營(yíng)運(yùn)資金引起了全日本的廣泛關(guān)注和極大的興趣。能否成功的獲得資金更大、更直接的影響了中小型企業(yè)命運(yùn)——或生存或倒閉。這些中小企業(yè)的融資主要是依賴于金融機(jī)構(gòu)貸款，而不是相關(guān)的大公司。這些中小企業(yè)有機(jī)會(huì)獲得各種形式的融資，包括發(fā)行股票和/或債券 。日本金融機(jī)構(gòu)正

3、在努力以應(yīng)對(duì)中小企業(yè)多樣化融資選擇的需要。貸款為基礎(chǔ)的融資模式，證券和資產(chǎn)抵押貸款是一些新型的中小型企業(yè)融資模式。然而，對(duì)于解決由多種原因所引起的信息不對(duì)稱的中小企業(yè)的資金問題，這些努力是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠的。促進(jìn)中小企業(yè)融資既是一個(gè)老問題同</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　SME Financing in Japan: What We Have

4、 Found</p><p>　　UESUGI Iichiro，RIETI.Research & Review.2006.01</p><p>　　Throughout the periods of the bubble economy and the subsequent "lost decade," the main players of the Japan

5、ese economy have been major banks and large-sized companies. These institutions were the driving force behind the creation of the bubble. They were also the biggest sufferers of the bubble burst; forced to take massive l

6、osses, their anguish continuing for many years. Needless to say, however, the Japanese economy does not consist only of major banks and companies. On the contrary, some 70%</p><p>　　How SMEs manage to obtain

7、 financing smoothly is of great interest both within and outside Japan. Success or failure in obtaining finance exerts a far greater and more direct impact on the fate -- i.e. survival or exit -- of SMEs, which are prima

8、rily dependant on loans from financial institutions, than on the fate of major companies, which have access to diverse forms of financing including the issuance of shares and/or bonds1. Japanese financial institutions ar

9、e trying to respond to the needs of</p><p>　　Based on the recognition discussed above, RIETI's Corporate Finance Study Group (Leader: Tsutomu Watanabe, Professor at Hitotsubashi University / Manager: Iic

10、hiro Uesugi, Fellow, RIETI) has been trying to analyze the behavior of SMEs particularly in financing activities. More specifically, by using a recently developed set of microdata on SMEs, we are examining statistical re

11、gularities observed in various aspects of SME financing, thereby attempting to clarify the financing environment faced by </p><p>　　Evolution of Financing Environment in the SMEs Lifecycle</p><p&g

12、t;　　SMEs, though referred to in bundle, are in fact extremely diverse in nature, ranging from high-tech startups to wagashi (traditional Japanese confectionery) shops with generations of history. Despite such diversity,

13、however, certain regularity can be found in the pattern of financing for SMEs. Practitioners note that the longer the history of SMEs, the lower their cost of borrowing. Thus, wecapture the evolution of SME financing, us

14、ing borrowing rates as a variable and focusing on the age of SME</p><p>　　Earlier studies provided a theoretical model which assumes that SMEs accumulate reputation as they continue to stay in business, thus

15、 their borrowing cost falls as they age. On the other hand, some people point to the effect of natural selection, that is, with the passage of time poorly performing borrowers would be selected by banks, subjected to hig

16、her interest rates, and eventually forced to exit. These two views differ in focus; the first looks only at surviving companies whereas the second </p><p>　　The results of our analysis show that older firms

17、are benefited from lower interest rates. But this is not the only finding. First, observation of the selection channel has found that companies with low return on assets (ROA) and equity ratios are paying high interest r

18、ates and eventually defaulting. This indicates that the mechanism of natural selection works properly for SMEs. Previous studies on banks' lending to major companies have found that so-called forbearance lending to l

19、ow-quality com</p><p>　　Since around the bubble period, the presence of excessively indebted and poorly performing companies -- particularly, in the so-called structurally depressed industries such as constr

20、uction, real estate, and wholesale and retail sectors -- has been pointed out. Of course, inefficient companies should exit from the market and this sort of Schumpeterian creative destruction is surely effective in impro

21、ving the financing environment for SMEs. However, what is suggested by the results of our latest </p><p>　　Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees</p><p>　　Firm age is not the only factor aff

22、ecting the financing environment. In reality, the provision of collateral and guarantors would make it easier to obtain loans. Collateral and personal guarantees are important particularly for SMEs, whose credit risks ar

23、e difficult to assess, and extensively used in the U.S. and many other countries.</p><p>　　Despite this, the role of collateral and personal guarantees tends to be viewed in a negative light. In 2003, the Fi

24、nancial Services Agency drew up an "Action Program Concerning Enhancement of Relationship Banking Functions." A report underpinning the program cites the concern that Japanese financial institutions might have

25、been excessively relying on the availability of collateral and personal guarantees in making loan decisions while failing to properly utilize invisible information obtained t</p><p>　　The implication of the

26、results is that collateral and personal guarantees play positive roles in obtaining loans. Specifically, our findings include: 1) high-risk companies that are prone to moral hazard provide more collateral and personal gu

27、arantees; and 2) companies providing collateral and personal guarantees are subject to more frequent monitoring by lending banks and more likely to build long-term and multi-faceted relationships with lending banks as co

28、mpared to companies of equivalent cre</p><p>　　Because data from earlier years are not available, we cannot quantitatively compare these findings with the general perception that "Japanese banks opted t

29、o forgo monitoring when borrowers offered real estate as collateral" during the bubble period. But as far as we can see based on our discussions with practitioners, the treatment of collateral in banks' loan dec

30、isions today is quite different from during the bubble period, due partly to sharp falls in asset prices, and it is unlikely banks bec</p><p>　　Effect of Public Credit Guarantee System</p><p>　　

31、Finally, let me discuss the influence of government interventions, particularly, the public credit guarantee system, in the credit market for SMEs6. Japan's credit guarantee systems have a very long history with the

32、total outstanding amount guaranteed as of today at about 30 trillion yen. The system grabbed public attention with the introduction of the government-sponsored "special credit guarantee program," a scheme desig

33、ned to alleviate a credit crunch faced by SMEs, from October 1998-March 20</p><p>　　In our study, we track the records of 3,000 companies, including companies that turned to the special program and those tha

34、t did not, using data in their financial statements for eight years from 1996-2003. Then, we measure the effect of the special credit guarantee program by comparing the financial data of these companies during the period

35、 before and after the introduction of the program. We find that the program has helped improve not only the financing environment but also business performan</p><p>　　These results indicate that the governme

36、nt's special credit guarantee program did alleviate the financial constraints of SMEs then seriously affected by the credit crunch, thereby inducing their investments. The implementation of investment projects that w

37、ould have been impossible without he easing of financial constraints resulted in the improvement of profitability in terms of the average for all samples. However, a closer look shows that the easing of financial constra

38、ints did not necessarily</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　In this article, the current state of SME financing in Japan is analyzed from various angles based on three papers . Each of the examined fa

39、ctors -- reputation as embodied by corporate age, the availability of collateral and/or personal guarantee, and the presence of the public credit guarantee system -- is generally conducive to improving the efficiency of

40、credit allocation.</p><p>　　There are several policy implications. First, the finding that the financing environment of SMEs changes more greatly through innovations by SMEs than through the exit of failing

41、companies points to the importance of smooth business succession in ensuring the survival of existing SMEs. This is quite important given the ongoing reality that the number of individual proprietor ships is rapidly decr

42、easing due to the aging of business owners.</p><p>　　Next, it has been found that the provision of collateral and/or personal guarantee, which is complementary to monitoring and relationship banking, is not

43、properly reflected in the interest rates and other terms and conditions of lending. Thus, it is hoped that the lowering of credit risks by the presence of collateral and/or personal guarantee will be properly processed i

44、n banks' credit screening, which is also important in creating an environment that facilitates the provision of collateral and</p><p>　　Finally, the contrasting results between low-risk and high-risk com

45、panies concerning the use of the public credit guarantee system -- i.e. performance improved at low-risk companies whereas profitability remained low at high-risk companies -- provide important suggestions in rethinking

46、the scope of the target for this particular policy measure. Assistance to high-risk companies may be justified from the viewpoint of preventing social anxiety that can be caused by a rapid increase in corporate ba</p&