委托代理關(guān)系下風(fēng)險(xiǎn)企業(yè)家的激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制.pdf

1、內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文委托代理關(guān)系下風(fēng)險(xiǎn)企業(yè)家的激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制姓名：李建軍申請學(xué)位級(jí)別：碩士專業(yè)：政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)指導(dǎo)教師：許柏年2002.6.4PRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIP&THEINCENTIVECONSTRAINTMECHANISMFORVENTUREENTREPRENEURSABSTRACTVenturecapital(vc)isanemergingindustryinChinaMuchofthetheoreti

2、calexplorationexaminesthemacroeconomicaspectsofVC，coveringthehistoryofforeignVCindustrytherolethatVCplaysinitsnationaleconomytherelationshipbetweengovernmentandVCetcThesestudieshelpcreateafriendlyenvironment’forthegrowth

3、ofventurecapitalindustryandatthesametimecallforafurtherexplorationintothemicroeconomicaspectsofVCThisPaDer100ksintotheincentiveconstraintmechanismoftheventurecapitalistovertheventureentrepreneurundertheprincipal—agentrel

4、ationshipThefirmcontrolledbyagentsisthefundamentalorganizationformofthemodementerprisesystem，whichmostoftheventureenterprisestakeThemostsignificantcharacteristicsofthefirmisthatownershipisseparatedfrommanagementIntheterm

5、ofprincipal—agenttheorytheownersareprincipalsandthemanagersareagentsAsfarasVCisconcemed。theventurecapitalistsareprincipalsandtheventureentrepreneursareagentsBecauseofasymmetricinformation，uncertainty，MoralHazardandAdvers

6、eSelectionthefirmiSfacedwithanagencyproblemagentsmaytakeactions(eg，shirking，irresponsibility)whichbenefitshimselfbutdoharmtoothersThekeyorganizationalissueistodesignacontractualarrangementbetweendifferentparticipantsofth

7、efirmSOastomakeeachmemberresponsibleforhisownactionsAstheprincipal，theownersmustmakeanoptimalincentive—constraintschemetoinspirethemanagement(agents)toactfortheirbestinterestsaswellaskeeptheagentsfromdoinganyharmtotheown

8、ersBeginningwithanintroductiontotheprincipal—agenttheoryandtheagencyproblem，thisresearchpaperdealswiththecausesoftheagencyriskandthemanagementofitThentheauthorcomesuDwiththeincentive—constraintmechanismofventurecapitalis